Title: Philosophy of Mind Code: PHI2502

Module Coordinator: Nick Unwin

Module Tutors: Nick Unwin

Level: HE2 Credit: 20 cps

Type: Standard Core/Option: Option

Pathway: Philosophy

Aims:

"How does technicolor phenomenology arise out of soggy grey matter?" Colin McGinn’s question vividly captures what is surely the chief question of philosophy of mind: the connections between mind and consciousness on the one hand and brain and matter on the other hand.

 Outcomes:

By the end of the module you should have a clearer appreciation of the range of questions raised in philosophy of mind, the variety of highly ingenious answers provided for those questions, and, importantly, the ability to argue these issues.

 Assessment:

We will assess whether these outcomes have been achieved by asking you to write one essay, and sit one 90-minute exam. The essay will be assessed on

• the clarity and cogency of your presentation of arguments
• your grasp of the issues and theories involved and ability to characterise them accurately and succinctly
• your ability to criticise and detect fallacies and weaknesses in arguments
• your ability to structure and present a clear and relevant discussion.

The exam will test your ability to answer questions on texts concisely and without the aid of external sources.

Learning and Teaching Strategy

There will be a one hour lecture each week which will introduce and explain the topics. This will be followed by a two hour seminar in which you will discuss and argue through these questions in the seminar group or in smaller groups. There will also be occasional tutorials to deal with difficulties and help you prepare the assessment assignment.

 Time Allocation

Syllabus by week

Week 1

Introduction to the mind-body problem. Descartes’s argument for a ‘real distinction’ between mind and body.

Week 2

Objections to Descartes’s argument. Leibniz’s Law and the problem of referential opacity.

Week 3

Behaviourism.

Week 4

Early versions of the mind-body identity thesis. Armstrong, Smart. The claim that physicalism is an empirical, not a philosophical thesis.

Week 5

Functionalism. Putnam’s objections to mind-brain identity. Could machines ever think?

Week 6

Anomalous monism. Davidson’s argument. The distinction between event-types and event-tokens. Are psychological explanations lawlike?

Week 7

More on psychological explanation. The problem of free will.

Week 8

The ‘explanatory gap’.

Week 9

The problem of causal over-determination. Epiphenomenalism.

Week 10

The ‘knowledge argument’.

Week 11

Supervenience. The idea of a ‘zombie’.

Week 12

Panpsychism.

Week 13

Revision.

Week 14

Exam.

Suggested Reading

D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968)

Chalmers, David, The Conscious Mind (Oxford: OUP, 1996)

——http://consc.net/online.html (a directory of online papers on consciousness)

———(ed.), Philosophy of mind : classical and contemporary readings ( Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002)

Churchland, Paul, Matter and Consciousness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988)

Crane, Tim, Elements of mind : an introduction to the philosophy of mind ( Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2001)

Dahlbom Bo (ed.), Dennett and his critics : demystifying mind (Oxford : Blackwell, 1993)

Davidson, Donald, Essays on Actions and Events, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980)

———‘Psychology as Philosophy’, in Davidson 1980, repr. In Lyons 1995

Dennett, Daniel, Elbow Room (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1984)

———The Intentional Stance (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1987)

———Consciousness Explained (London : Penguin, 1993)

Dennett, Daniel and D. Hofstadter (eds), The Mind’s I (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1982)

Descartes, Ren é, Meditations (many editions, including online)

Kenny, A.J.P., Descartes (Random House, New York, 1968)

———Will, Freedom and Power (Oxford: Blackwell 1975)

Lucas, J.R., The Freedom of the Will (Oxford: OUP, 1970)

Lycan, William (ed.), Mind and Cognition: A Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990)

Lyons, William (ed.), Modern Philosophy of Mind (London: J.M. Dent, 1995)

McGinn, Colin, the Character of Mind

Nagel Thomas, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: CUP, 1991)

———‘What is it like to be a bat?’, in Nagel 1991, Lyons 1995

———‘Panpsychism’, in Nagel 1991

Papineau, David, Consciousness ( Cambridge: Icon, 2000)

———The rise of physicalism, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau/Staff/Papineau/OnlinePapers/Risephys.html

Presley, C.F. (ed.), The Identity Theory of Mind (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1971)

Priest, Stephen, Theories of the Mind (London: Penguin, 1981)

Putnam, Hilary, ‘Philosophy and our mental life’, in Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: CUP, 1975). Repr. In Lyons 1995.

Ravenscroft, Ian, Philosophy of mind : a beginner's guide ( Oxford: OUP, 2004)

Rey, Georges, Contemporary philosophy of mind : a contentiously classical approach (Oxford : Blackwell, 1997)

Ryle, Gilbert,The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949)

Searle, John, Mind: a Brief Introduction ( Oxford: OUP, 2004)

Smart, J.J.C., ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, in Lyons 1995

Smith, Peter and O.R. Jones (ed.), The Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: CUP, 1986)

Sprigge, Timothy, ‘Panpsychism’, http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/PANPSYCHISM.html

Tye, Michael, Ten Problems of Consciousness (London: MIT Press, 1995)

Williams, Bernard, Descartes: the project of pure inquiry

Numerous online articles can be found at David Chalmers’ website listed above, and linked directly from the Philosophy pages at www.bolton.ac.uk/philosophy. Online encyclopedias (Stanford, Wikipedia, etc.) also contain many excellent articles.